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SOSA V. AL VAREZ-MACHAIN-RESTRICTING
ACCESS TO US COURTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE: REVERSING THE TREND
Laura A. Cisneros
I. INTRODUCTION
To function with adequate predictability and efficiency, the
international community must maintain orderly relations among its
members. This necessarily requires that members develop international
norms of behavior and accept a certain loss of their otherwise exclusive
sovereignty. Nowhere has the enforcement of international norms been
more pronounced than in the area of human rights. International human
rights norms directly challenge conventional notions of exclusive state
sovereignty and unilateral action. The United States has long been a motive
force behind the international human rights movement, opening its federal
courts to redress human rights violations committed domestically or abroad.
Specifically, federal courts have used the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)1
and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 2 to exercise jurisdiction over human rights
violations and grant relief when warranted. In the aftermath of September
11, however, the United States has found itself in a dilemma: how to
encourage the development of human rights jurisprudence around the world
without making itself liable for alleged human rights violations committed
pursuant to the war on terror. For nearly half a century the United States
Supreme Court has willingly extended its jurisdiction to victims of human
1. The Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. (West 2004) [hereinafter
FTCA]. The Federal Torts Claims Act authorizes a suit "for... personal injury ... caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West 2004).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2004) [hereinafter ATS]. The ATS provides in its entirety that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
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3rights violations. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, however, represents a
departure from this long-standing practice and limits access to U.S. federal
courts in human rights cases.
This casenote will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa and
the manner in which that decision defines the limits of the FTCA and the
ATS. First, the casenote will review the background facts and procedural
history of Sosa, including the decisions of the district and appellate courts.
Second, it will consider the Court's treatment of FTCA claims when the
alleged injury occurs in a foreign country, paying particular attention to the
Court's rejection of the "headquarters doctrine" as a means of exercising
jurisdiction over such claims and imposing liability on the United States
and its employees. Third, it will describe the Court's refusal to expand the
reach of the ATS beyond a limited and highly specific set of claims, most of
which relate to violations of the law of nations, as that body of law was
understood in 1789 when the ATS was adopted. Finally, the casenote will
evaluate Sosa in light of post-9/11 domestic security and American foreign
policy concerns and explore the potential effects of the Sosa decision
beyond its immediate impact on the litigants.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1985, special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar (Camarena), of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), was abducted while on
4assignment in Mexico. In a house in Guadalajara, his captors tortured him
over the course of a two-day interrogation and then murdered him.5
Eyewitness testimony led DEA officials to believe that Humberto Alvarez-
Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican citizen and medical doctor, was present at
the house and acted to prolong Camarena's life to draw out the
interrogation and torture.
6
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Alvarez for his role in the
torture and murder of Camarena, and the United States District Court for
the Central District of California issued a warrant for his arrest. 7 The
United States requested the Mexican government's assistance in obtaining
3. See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979), overruled by Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004); Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
overruled by Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993); Couzado v. United States, 105 F.3d
1389 (1 1th Cir. 1997), overruled by Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739.
4. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by 374
F.3d 1384 (2004).
5. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746.
6. Id.
7. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609.
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custody of Alvarez but made no formal demand to extradite him. 8 Instead,
DEA officials in Washington, D.C. approved the use of Mexican nationals,
unaffiliated with either government, to seize Alvarez and bring him to the
United States for trial. 9 On April 2, 1990, a group of Mexican nationals,
including Jose Francisco Sosa (Sosa), kidnapped Alvarez and held him
overnight in a motel.' 0 The next day his captors smuggled him by private
plane into the United States where federal officers arrested him. i'
Alvarez filed a motion to dismiss. 12 He argued that his arrest violated
the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty thereby vitiating federal court
jurisdiction over him.' 3  The district court agreed, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial.' 4 The
Supreme Court applied the doctrine announced in Ker v. Illinois,15 and held
that forcible abduction of a person to bring them within the court's
jurisdiction does not abrogate the court's authority to try them. 16 Tried in
1992, the case ended at the close of the government's case, when the district
court granted Alvarez's motion for summary judgment for kidnapping and
detention.' 7 The district judge granted the motion on the ground that the
government had adduced insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict,
concluding that "the case against Alvarez was based on 'suspicion and...
hunches but ... no proof,' and that the government's theories were 'whole
cloth, the wildest speculation."",1
8
Alvarez's original action filed in 1993 named Sosa, a number of other
Mexican nationals, the United States, and individual DEA agents as
defendants.' 9 Later, the case was pared down, leaving only Sosa and the
United States as defendants. At issue in this case was "Alvarez's damages
claim for alleged false arrest by the United States under the FTCA and
damages claim against Sosa under the ATS." 20 Alvarez claimed Sosa had
violated the law of nations by participating in a transborder abduction not
8. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746.
12. Id.
13. See Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609.
14. Id. at 610.
15. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
16. See id.
17. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746.
18. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610.
19. Id. at 609-10. "The DEA agent in charge of the Camarena murder investigation.., hired
Antonio Garate Bustamante ... to contact Mexican nationals who could help apprehend Alvarez."
Garate arranged for Sosa to participate in Alvarez's seizure and transborder abduction. Id.
20. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
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authorized by law. 2' The district court granted the government's motion for
22summary judgment and dismissed Alvarez's FTCA claim. As to his ATS
claim against Sosa, however, the district court entered summary judgment
in favor of Alvarez and awarded him $25,000 in damages.23
The Ninth Circuit then reversed the dismissal of Alvarez's FTCA
claims against the United States and affirmed the ATS judgment against
Sosa, in essence giving Alvarez relief on both causes of action. The
defendants requested a rehearing with the Ninth Circuit, and a divided en
banc court reaffirmed. 25 As to the FTCA claim, the court held that (1) the
DEA lacked statutory authority to effect an extraterritorial arrest, and (2)
the DEA could not avail itself of the law of citizen arrest to extend its
authority beyond its territorial limits. 26 Thus, the United States was liable
to Alvarez under California law for the tort of false arrest.27
As to the ATS claim, the court relied on its own precedent. It held
that the Act provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction and
creates a private right of action for an alleged violation of the law of
28,nations. "[S]ection 1350 does not require that the action 'arise under' the
law of nations, but only mandates a 'violation of the law of nations' in order
to create a cause of action...."29 The court acknowledged a "clear and
universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention."
' 30
With only a United States court-issued warrant and no basis in law for its
actions, the DEA-with Sosa's help-had illegally arrested and detained
Alvarez. 31 Consequently, the United States had committed a tort under the
law of nations.
32
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alvarez's case
21. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
22. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 611.
23. Id.
24. See Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1064.
25. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
26. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 641.
27. Id. at 640-41.
28. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (emphasis removed).
29. Id
30. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620-29 nn. 16-17. "The Universal Declaration ... provides
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile," Universal Declaration art.
9, and the ICCPR, which the United States has ratified, unequivocally obligates states parties to
refrain from 'arbitrary arrest or detention."' Id.
31. Id. at 631.
32. Id.
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against the United States to clarify the scope of the FTCA and, in Alvarez's
case against Sosa, to clarify the scope of the ATS.33 The Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit decision on both claims, holding: (1) the FTCA's waiver of
governmental sovereign immunity does not extend to tort claims whose
liability-causing injury takes place on foreign soil, 34 regardless of where the
tortious act or omission giving rise to that injury occurred; 35 and (2) the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute and does not create a statutory cause of action
for aliens beyond those few international law violations recognized by the
36common law in 1789 when the ATS was enacted. However, such causes
of action may be recognized in the future provided they meet the same high




A. THE FTCA AND THE "HEADQUARTERS DOCTRINE"
The FTCA permits suit against the United States government and
renders it liable in tort, as a private individual would be under similar
38circumstances. The FTCA likewise authorizes federal district courts to
adjudicate claims against the United States for injuries caused by a
government employee acting within the scope of his office or
employment. 39 There are, however, limitations on the FTCA's waiver of
sovereign immunity, namely, the Act bars "any claim arising in a foreign
country.,
40
To ensure that this "foreign country" exception did not immunize the
United States government from U.S.-sponsored torts committed abroad,
federal courts have applied what is known as the "headquarters doctrine, 41
under which the United States is estopped from invoking the "foreign
country" exception where the tort giving rise to the injury was planned or
initiated by United States government officials located (i.e., headquartered)
in the United States.
33. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
34. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000) (limiting the waiver of sovereign immunity as to "[a]ny
claim arising in a foreign country").
35. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 2761-62.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747; Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
39. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
40. Id. at 2748 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)).
41. See, e.g., Sami, 617 F.2d at 762. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 91.
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The headquarters doctrine was initially developed in Richards v.
United States, which, ironically, did not involve a foreign injury.42 At issue
in Richards was which law a federal court should apply in an FTCA suit
where a negligent act in one state injures someone in another state.43
Petitioners, representing passengers killed in an airplane that took off from
Oklahoma and crashed in Missouri, filed suit in the Northern District of
Oklahoma against the United States." They alleged that the Government,
through the Civil Aviation Agency, had negligently failed to enforce the
terms of various federal regulations, that would have prohibited certain
maintenance practices of the airline in its overhaul depot in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
45
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a three-fold conflict
among the circuit courts and articulate a uniform rule that could be applied
in FTCA cases.46 The Court determined that under the FTCA, federal
courts hearing multi-state tort actions must look first to the law of the
place 47 where the negligent act occurred and not to the place where the
negligent act had its operative effect. In other words, the location of the
tort, and not the injury, controlled the choice of law.
Following Richards, appellate courts applied the headquarters doctrine
to prevent immunity of government officials whose acts or omissions in the
United States caused injuries in foreign countries.49 For example, in Sami
42. See 369 U.S. at 10; Jamie Shapiro, Aliens' Redress of Grievances Against the United
States for International Human Rights Violations, 10 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 195, 211-212 (2003-
2004).
43. Richards, 369 U.S. at 2.
44. Id. at 3. (The airlines had already settled with each petitioner, paying the maximum
amount recoverable under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act).
45. Id.
46. See id.; see also Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1958) (holding that the
reference in Section 1346(b) to "place where the act or omission occurred" directs application of
only the internal law of that state); Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding
that a court must refer to the whole law of the state where the act or omission occurred); United
States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that the internal law of the place where
the negligence had its operative effect should control).
47. Richards, 369 U.S. at 10-11 (concluding that the "law of the place" included conflicts of
law rules).
48. Id.
49. See Shapiro, supra note 42, at 211-13. See also Couzado, 105 F.3d 1389 (1 1th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the foreign country exception to the FTCA did not bar suit against the United States
where passengers and crew of a commercial airliner were arrested and incarcerated in Honduras
because of cocaine placed on board by United States government agents as part of a sting
operation); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1255
(E.D.N.Y.) (1984) (Even though the injuries occurred in Vietnam, the United Stats could be held
liable because decisions related to specifications and use of Agent Orange occurred with in the
United States).
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v. United States, the court applied the headquarters doctrine to plaintiffs
claim that German officials wrongfully detained him based on a
communiqu6 sent by a United States government official. 50 The court held
that a FTCA claim arises in the United States if the negligent act or
omission takes place in the United States, regardless of whether the act or
omission has its operative effect in a foreign country.51 Subject matter
jurisdiction could also be predicated on allegations that a negligent failure
to warn, instruct or train in the United States proximately caused damage or
injury abroad.12 The holdings in the cases building on Richards indicate
that a claim is not barred by the foreign country exception where the
tortious conduct occurs in the United States, but the injury is sustained in a
foreign country.
The Supreme Court in Sosa rejected the circuit courts' post-Richards
approach and consequently rejected the headquarters doctrine outright,
thereby revitalizing the foreign country exception.53  Adhering to policy
considerations, it was unwilling to uphold the headquarters doctrine for fear
it would overwhelm the purpose of the foreign country exception, which
was to prevent federal courts from applying foreign law to tort claims
brought against the United States and its employees.
There is perhaps a larger political issue involved here. Since the
attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has taken military action
abroad, exposing American soldiers and decision-makers to potential FTCA
claims lodged by foreigners.55 If the law continues to permit such claims,
50. See Sami, 617 F.2d at 761-62.
51. See id at 762.
52. See, e.g., Beattie, 756 F.2d 91 (where the court asserted jurisdiction over claims based on
plaintiffs' allegations that the negligent selection, training, and supervision of air traffic
controllers by officials in Washington, D.C. caused the airplane to crash in Antarctica). But cf.
Eaglin v. United States Dep't of Army, 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986) (where the court declined to
assert jurisdiction under the FTCA where the alleged negligent failure to warn of hazardous
weather conditions in West Germany during plaintiffs training in the United States was not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury in that country).
53. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
54. Id. at 2749. ("[f]t will virtually always be possible to assert that the negligent activity that
injured the plaintiff [abroad] was the consequence of faulty training, selection or supervision-or
even less than that, lack of careful training, selection or supervision-in the United States.")
(citing Beattie, 756 F.2d at 119 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
55. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 645 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting):
We are now in the midst of a global war on terrorism, a mission that our
political branches have deemed necessary to conduct throughout the world,
sometimes with tepid or even non-existent cooperation from foreign nations.
With this context in mind, our court today commands that a foreign-national
criminal who was apprehended abroad pursuant to a legally valid indictment
is entitled to sue our government for money damages. In so doing, and
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the judicial and executive branches would surely collide, with disastrous
results. This may or may not explain the Court's shift to a more restrictive
approach to FTCA lawsuits, but it certainly provides the context in which
that shift is made.
B. THE ATS: FILARTIGA AND ITS PROGENY
For two centuries, the ATS received little attention because litigants
rarely used it. Since 1980, however, plaintiffs have invoked the ATS to
redress serious human rights violations such as disappearance, 56 genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity,57 torture and murder,58 and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.59 Federal courts have granted relief in
such cases, holding that these "torts" transgress the law of nations, and thus
trigger jurisdiction under the ATS.60 It appears, however, that this trend has
run its course. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa signals a
retrenchment of judicial policy with respect to ATS claims. To understand
the magnitude and significance of this change, one must first return to the
case that started the general expansion of ATS jurisdiction: Filcirtiga v.
Peta-Irala.61
In 1980, the Second Circuit allowed a Paraguayan family to sue a
Paraguayan police official in federal district court in Brooklyn for a
62kidnapping and murder that occurred in Paraguay. In Fildrtiga, Americo
Pefia-Irala, a Paraguayan police officer, tortured seventeen-year-old Joelito• • • 63...
Fillrtiga to death. The brutal incident occurred entirely within the
territory of Paraguay. 4  Some years later, the Filartiga family, having... . .65
relocated to New York, discovered Peia-Irala living in Brooklyn. The
Filhrtigas filed suit in federal court under the ATS. The district court
67
relied on Second Circuit precedent and took a hands-off approach. It held
that a state's treatment of its own citizen is not controlled by international
despite its protestations to the contrary, the majority has left the door open
for the objects of our international war on terrorism to do the same.
56. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
57. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993).
58. See In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Marcos-Manotoc v.
Trajano, 508 U.S. 972 (1993).
59. See Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
60. See cases cited supra notes 50-53.
61. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. See id.
63. Filrtiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 878-79.
66. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
67. Id. at 880.
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law.68 The appellate court reversed. 69 It held instead that the phrase "the
law of nations" in the ATS could be broadly interpreted as including
international law.70  The Court looked to both the executive branch and
international law experts to determine the rules of international law. 71 The
Court agreed with all the sources that a state violates binding international
legal norms if it tortures its own citizens. 72
From 1980 until the mid-1990s, courts applied the holding of
Fil6rtiga-that an alien may sue for violations of "universal, definable, and
obligatory" international law norms-with little dissent.73  After
establishing that the ATS supported causes of action against foreign
governmental officials, courts in the late 1990s issued a line of cases
extending that rule to hold corporations accountable for their activities
abroad. A number of multinational corporations have been sued under the
ATS for murder, torture, toxic harm, genocide, enslavement, and rape
associated with their pro ects in various countries including Ecuador, India,
the Sudan, and Nigeria.7
In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit further expanded the ATS's
jurisdictional reach by holding private individuals and corporations acting
on behalf of a state liable for violations of international legal norms.
Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina filed suit under the ATS against the leader
of the de facto regime in that country for various atrocities including rape,
forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution at
76the hands of the Bosnian-Serb military. The court of appeals reversed the
district court and held that (1) some international norms applied equally to
private actors and government officials, and (2) a private actor could be
held liable for violating an international norm that requires state action
when acting in complicity with a state actor.77 Kadic, therefore, extended





72. Id. at 884.
73. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 941 (2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Martinez v.
City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir.
1996); Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 830 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001); Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88.
75. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-51.
76. See id. at 236-37.
77. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
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circumstances.
However, in Sosa, the Court departed significantly from the post-
Richardson and post-Filrtiga decisions that broadened the scope of the
FTCA and the ATS respectively. The Sosa court set forth a more
constrained and limited interpretation of the statutes.
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision. The Court rejected the headquarters doctrine as an exception to
the foreign country exception of the FTCA and limited the reach of the ATS
to a select few causes of action.78
A. THE FTCA AND THE HEADQUARTERS DOCTRINE
The Court first considered the validity of the headquarters doctrine.79
The Ninth Circuit found that Alvarez's arrest was false, and thus tortious,
only to the extent it occurred in Mexico, outside the DEA's jurisdiction.
80
The foreign country exception, therefore, would seem to apply, operating to
frustrate Alvarez's claim. The Ninth Circuit found, however, that although
Alvarez's injury-the kidnapping-occurred in Mexico, DEA agents in the
United States planned and orchestrated it. s  The Ninth Circuit thus applied
the headquarters doctrine and granted jurisdiction over Alvarez's 
claim.
Because the Court believed that the headquarters doctrine would
eradicate the foreign country exception to the FTCA, it rejected its• 83
application in cases potentially implicating the foreign country exception.
78. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754-55. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion. Justice Scalia
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and concurred in
judgment and filed an opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Breyer concurred in part
and concurred in judgment and filed an opinion. Id
79. See id. at 2747 (where the government raised a twofold defense to liability under the
FTCA: (1) it argued that its arrest of Alvarez was not tortious, asserting that 21 U.S.C. § 878
authorized the DEA to arrest Alvarez in Mexico; and (2) it maintained that under the clear text of
the FTCA, the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to claims "arising in a foreign
country" and that Alvarez's claim, therefore, fails for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court applied the exception and decided on that ground.).
80. See id. at 2748.
81. See id.; see also Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 638 (where DEA officials in Los Angeles
made the decision to kidnap Alvarez; DEA officials in Washington, D.C., approved the details of
the operation, and DEA officials provided transportation particulars to the arrest team and
obtained clearance for the landing in El Paso, Texas).
82. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2780.
83. See id (citing Beattie, 756 F.2d at 119) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t will virtually always
be possible to assert that the negligent activity that injured the plaintiff [abroad] was the
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In support of its position, the Court first considered cases alleging harm
resulting from action in a foreign country and planning in the United
States. The Court acknowledged the significance of proximate cause
analysis in "headquarters" cases, but explained that a mere connection
between domestic behavior and foreign harm was insufficient alone to bar
application of the foreign country exception and extend the jurisdictional
reach of the federal courts.
85
Next, the Court looked to historical precedent and concluded that there
was good reason to think that Congress understood a claim "arising in" a
foreign country to be a claim for injury or harm occurring in that country.86
The Court explained that state statutes existing at the time the FTCA was
adopted used the phrase "arising in" to determine which state's limitations
period applied in cases involving transjurisdictional facts. 7  History also
demonstrated that courts likewise applied this interpretation to tort cases. 8
The Court stated that Congress, when it drafted the FTCA, would have been
familiar with this standard interpretation of "arising in," and was well aware
that when an injury occurs in a foreign country, the law of the alien nation,
not that of the United States, would be applied. 89  Recognizing this,
Congress attached the foreign country exception to the FTCA's general
waiver of sovereign immunity.
9 0
The Court then explained that choice of law analysis further supported
the view that the foreign country exception intended "arising in" to refer to
consequence or faulty training, selection or supervision-or even less than that, lack of careful
training, selection or supervision-in the United States.").
84. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2748-49.
85. See id at 2750 (citing Beattie, 756 F.2d at 119 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) ("[I]n the ordinary
case there may be several points along the chain of causality" pertinent to the enquiry. Here, for
example, proximate cause may be attributed to both the DEA's actions in California and Sosa's
actions in Mexico. The establishment of a legal cause of harm in California does not eliminate the
conclusion that the claim is based on harm proximately caused by actions in Mexico.").
86. See id.
87. See id. (According to the Court, the general rule at that time was that "a cause of action
arising in another jurisdiction, which is barred by the laws of that jurisdiction, will [also] be barred
in the domestic courts.") (quoting Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application, in Nonstatutory Personal Injury Actions, of State Statute Providing for Borrowing of
Stature ofLimitations ofAnother State, 41 A.L.R. 4th 1025 (1985)).
88. See id. ("A commentator noted in 1962 that, for the purposes of these borrowing statutes,
"[t]he courts unanimously hold that a cause of action sounding in tort arises in the jurisdiction
where the last act necessary to establish liability occurred"; i.e., "the jurisdiction in which injury
was received.."" (quoting John W. Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws,
15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 47 (1963))).
89. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2750.
90. See id
Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law
the place of harm, and not to the place of tortious conduct.9 1 "When the
FTCA was passed, the dominant principle in choice of law analysis was lex
loci delecti," meaning that "courts generally applied the law of the place
where the injury occurred." 9 2 Under this traditional rule, the presumptive
choice would be to apply foreign law to determine the tortfeasor's liability
to a plaintiff injured in a foreign country.93 Applying foreign substantive
law, however, was precisely what Congress intended the foreign country
exception to avoid. Although most courts adhere to the traditional
approach to choice of law conflicts, even courts using a flexible balancing
analysis to inform choice of law95 usually default to the traditional
96
approach. In practice, the modem approach frequently leads to the same
91. See id
92. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2750 ("The general conflict-of-laws rule, followed by a vast
majority of the States, is to apply the law of the place of injury to the substantive rights of the
parties." (quoting Richards, 369 U.S. at 11-12)); see also Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2750. ("place of
wrong for torts involving bodily harm is 'the place where the harmful force takes effect upon the
body"' (quoting Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377, note 1 (1934))); § 379 ("the law of
the place of wrong").
93. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751 (quoting Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3
(1975)) (per curiam) (where the Court noted that "Texas would apply Cambodian law to
wrongful-death action involving explosion in Cambodia of an artillery round manufactured in
United States"); see also id. (quoting Thomas v. FMC Corp., 610 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Ala. 1985))
(where the court applied "German law to determine American manufacturer's liability for
negligently designing and manufacturing a Howitzer that killed decedent in Germany"); id
(quoting Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970) (noting that "Italian
law applies to allegations of negligent manufacture in Kansas that resulted in an airplane crash in
Italy").
94. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751-52. ("In 1942, the House Committee on the Judiciary
considered an early draft of the FTCA that would have exempted all claims 'arising in a foreign
country in behalf of an alien."') (quoting H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., § 303(12)).
The bill was then revised at the suggestion of the Attorney General to omit the last five words. In
explaining the amendment to the House Committee, Assistant Attorney General Shea said that,
"[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill, H.R. 6463, whether or
not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined by the law of the situs of the
wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims arising in this country."
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (signaling Congress's "unwilling[ness] to
subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of foreign power").
95. See Gary J. Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the United States: Notes on
Rereading Von Mehren, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 125 (2003) ("The traditional methodology of
place of wrong ... has receded in importance, and new approaches and concepts such as
governmental interest analysis, most significant relationship, and better rule of law have taken
over center stage.").
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969) (where tort liability is
determined "by the local law of the state which ... has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties," taking into account "(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered").
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result as the traditional, and applies the law of the jurisdiction of injury.97
The Court explained, therefore, that under both traditional and modem
choice of law methodologies, the headquarters doctrine would require
federal courts to apply foreign law to tort claims against the United States
and its employees-exactly what the foreign country exception was meant
to avoid.
98
Finally, in response to the argument that federal courts could
selectively apply the headquarters doctrine when a state's choice of law
approach would not apply foreign law of place of harm, the Court stated
that such a design would vary from state to state to such a degree as to.... 99
frustrate the goals of uniform federal jurisdiction. Thus, the Court was
unwilling to recognize a scheme of federal jurisdiction allowing for
selective application of the headquarters doctrine in cases that did not
implicate foreign law. Based on the Court's analysis, application of the
headquarters doctrine would violate either the choice of law rules or the
legislative intent of Congress. 00 Declining to advance either outcome, the
Court rejected the headquarters doctrine and held "that the FTCA's foreign
country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign
country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred."''
1
B. DEFINING THE ATS
Having disposed of Alvarez's FTCA claim against the United States,
the Court then addressed his ATS claim against Sosa. 1 2 Alvarez asserted
that the ATS went beyond a jurisdictional grant and authorized a private
right of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations, i.e.,
international law.'03  Although the Court concluded that the ATS was
jurisdictional and provided no new causes of action, 104 it rejected Sosa's
97. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2753; see, e.g., Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354 (8th
Cir. 1994) (applying Canadian law where negligent saw design in Missouri caused injury in
Canada); Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Costa Rican law where
letter written and mailed in Arizona caused mental distress in Costa Rica); McKinnon v. F.H.
Morgan & Co., 750 A.2d 1026 (Vt. 2000) (applying Canadian law where a defective bicycle sold
in Vermont caused injuries in Quebec).
98. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2753.
99. See id. at 2754 (where the Court refused to equate "arising in a foreign country" with
"implicating foreign law," explained that to allow selective application on this basis would create
jurisdictional variety from state to state benefiting or penalizing plaintiffs accordingly, and stated
such jurisdictional inconsistency was too implausible to be what Congress intended).
100. See id. at 2752.
101. Id. at 2754.
102. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754 .
103. Id. at 2755.
104. Id. (relying on the ATS's placement within the Judiciary Act as support of its strictly
jurisdictional nature).
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counterargument that the statute did not recognize any cause of action
absent further legislation from Congress. 1°5 Instead, the Court concluded
that history sanctioned the ATS's jurisdictional authority to include the
power to hear a limited category of claims. 106  The claims, the Court
explained, were narrowly defined and embraced those international
common law causes of action recognized and understood in 1789:
"violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and• ,,107
piracy. The Court concluded that, based on the most reasonable
inference from the historical materials, the jurisdictional grant is best read
as being embedded with causes of action for the limited number of
international law violations whose potential personal liability could
implicate whole states or nations in the international arena.'
The next question was whether the First Congress vested district
courts with the jurisdiction to hear private cases alleging violations of the
law of nations. The Court once again consulted the historical record and
determined that the First Congress did intend courts to have this
authority. 10 9 Because the historical record is equivocal at best, the Court
was unwilling to assume that Congress intended to expand the types of
private causes of action beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone's
three primary offenses. 110 The Court recognized, however, that nothing in
two centuries of case law expressly ruled that this suite of international law
torts was exhaustive,' nor had Congress limited the ATS or civil common
law power by any other statute. Still, the Court advised, any new causes of• . ,112
action had to have the same specificity and universality as the originals.
The Court, therefore, granted discretion to the federal courts to expand the
category of recognized causes of action under the ATS, but tempered that
discretion with a high threshold.1 3 Any claim based on the present-day law
of nations must be grounded on a "norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th century paradigms."
'" 14
105. See id. at 2754.
106. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754-61 (relating to historical context outlining the genesis of the
statute and the First Congress's motivation in adopting it).
107. Id. at 2754 (noted in 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68
(1769)).




112. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 2761-62.
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The Court then explained why judicial caution is necessary when
considering whether to recognize a new private cause of action for an
alleged international tort.1 15 First, the notion of common law has changed
since 1789.116 In the modem view, common law is grounded in legislative
• 117
action.
Second, further distinguishing the lawmaking function of the
legislature from the interpretive function of the judiciary, the Court
reiterated its position articulated in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 118 that there is
no federal "general" common law. 1 19 The Court concluded that while it
does not shrink from making judicial rules of decision that affect foreign
relations, 120 the Court's general practice was to look for legislative guidance
on the applicable substantive law before issuing new federal common
law. 121
Third, the Court acknowledged that the legislature is best equipped to• • • 122 ..
create a private right of action. A private right of action is a tremendous
grant of power to individual citizens because it gives them direct access to
the courts and a means of enforcing the terms of a statute. 123 Even in the
domestic arena, when Congress enacts a statute that applies expressly to
private conduct, the Court will not infer a private right of action if one is
not provided by the statute. 124 The Court thought it wise to exercise this
same caution when dealing with statutes govemin4 international norms,
because of their potential for collateral consequences.
Finally, the Court determined that Congress had not given federal
115. Id.
116. See id (explaining that in the 18th century, the prevailing thought was that the common
law was something that existed unto itself and only had to be discovered); see also Black and
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining that the common law "was "a transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute").
117. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762; ("[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative ...
[because t]he very consideration which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology,
are the secret root from which the laws draws all the juices of life. I mean of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned." (quoting THE COMMON LAW
(Howe ed. 1963))).
118. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
119. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
120. See id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) (creating
the act of state doctrine).
121. Id. at 2762.
122. See id. at 2762-63.
123. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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courts a mandate to seek out and define new violations of the law of
nations. 126 Nor had Congress indicated that it would entertain judicial
creativity in this field. 27 The passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, which articulated a clear but limited private right of action for
victims of torture, satisfied the Court that Congress's reluctance to grant
such powers to the federal courts was not an oversight.
128
The Court found that Alvarez failed to justify his contention that the
prohibition of arbitrary arrest had attained the status of binding customary
law such as to create a right of action under the ATS. 129 The Court relied
on the reasoning of lower courts that have faced the issue over the last
twenty years. 13  The Court indicated that in addition to assessing a claim
for its specificity, universality, and obligatory nature, courts should also
consider the ramifications of allowing these claims in federal courts.131
Three concurring opinions accompanied the Sosa decision. Justice
Scalia issued a sharp condemnation of the Court's decision to grant
discretion to the federal courts to consider new causes of action under the
ATS. 132  Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court's decision in Erie
Railroad-that all federal common law is made pursuant to Congressional
authority conferred on federal courts-necessarily prohibits federal courts
from declaring that additional international norms are judicially enforceable
absent Congressional authorization.13 3  Additionally, Justice Scalia
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id ("The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 73, provid[es] authority that
'establish[es] an unambiguous and modem basis for' federal claims of torture and extrajudicial
killing" (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, pt. 1, p. 3 (1991)); id. ("The legislative history includes
the remark that § 1350 should "remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law. Congress has done
nothing to promote such suits.").
129. See id. at 2765. (Alvarez presented little authority citing nonbinding international
agreements with moral authority but little utility under the opinion's set of standards. The Court
stated, "we are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was
enacted.") Id.
130. See id. at 2765-66 ("For purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate
and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind" (quoting Fildrtiga,
630 F.2d at 890)); id. (suggesting that the limits of section 1350's reach be defined by "a handful
of heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal, and obligatory norms" (quoting
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781)); id. ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm
that is specific, universal, and obligatory." (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475)).
131. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766.
132. See id. at 2772.
133. Id. at 2771; see also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-
41 (1981) ("The vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to
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criticized the fact that the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision while
endorsing the standards the Circuit court used to determine that Alvarez's
claim reached the level of specificity, universality, and obligation rising to
the level of "the law of nations."134 Justice Scalia's concurrence expressed
frustration with the formula the Court endorsed for determining which torts
actually qualify as violations of the law of nations.
1 35
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a concurring opinion
that reached the same conclusion under an alternative theory. 136  Justice
Breyer's concurrence stated that notions of international comity should
inform the jurisdictional analysis under the ATS. 137 He suggested that the
ATS should only reach claims where there is both "substantive agreement
as to certain universally condemned behavior and procedural agreement that
universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of 
that behavior." 138
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Sosa departs significantly from two
lines of cases which, over the last few decades, have increased the United
States' liability for torts and extended federal court access to alien tort
plaintiffs making claims against private actors, including corporations.
By rejecting the headquarters doctrine, the Court cut the only line
victims had to tether the United States, its officials, or employees to liability
for tort violations orchestrated or financed in the United States but carried
out in foreign countries. In a climate where the United States's executive
branch is directing military action abroad, abrogation of the headquarters
doctrine weakens any would-be plaintiffs chance to litigate his or her tort
claim in federal court when the defendant is the United States government.
The Court's decision thus functions as a useful shield in the government's
unconventional war on terrorism.
The Court's opinion regarding ATS claims likewise benefits private
defendants, including corporations, by confirming that the jurisdictional
authority to formulate federal common law.").
134. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2775.
135. See id. at 2774-75. ("The Ninth Circuit brought us the judgment that the Court reverses
today[,] ... [b]ut the verbal formula it applied is the same verbal formula that the Court explicitly
endorses.").
136. See id. at 2776. The Justices agreed with the Court that the foreign country exception
barred Alvarez's claim under the FTCA but they would read the words "arising in" as they appear
in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), to mean "place where the act or omission occurred," § 1346(b)(1), not
"place of injury," ante, at 2752, 2754, and n. 9. Id. at 2777.
137. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2782.
138. Id. at 2782-83.
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nature of the ATS creates no new causes of action. Indeed, the Court in
Sosa has reversed the trend established by the Fildrtiga line of cases that
tended to expand private actors' liability for violations of international law.
And although the majority's opinion in Sosa grants federal courts limited
discretion to consider new causes of action under the ATS in certain
circumstances, and thus does not preclude plaintiffs from using the ATS to
bring suits in federal court alleging violations of international law, it places
the bar almost out of reach. No new cause of action will likely arise except
for those norms of international law accepted by the "civilized" world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the three offenses recognized in the
18th century (injuries to ambassadors, interference with safe passage, and
piracy). Given this small opening, it is likely that human rights activists
will continue to file suits against corporations conducting business in
foreign countries, alleging complicity in the abuses committed by foreign
regimes against their own citizens. Still, it is just as likely that such suits
will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
One of the first cases to test this decision of the Court will be Doe v.
Unocal Corp. currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.'3 9  In Doe,
Burmese peasants filed suit against Unocal Corporation and others alleging
that the company shared responsibility for human rights abuses, including
forced labor, forced relocation, rape and torture, committed by the Burmese
military regime in connection with a gas pipeline project."' Plaintiffs
premise Unocal's liability on their agreement to participate in a joint
venture to construct the pipeline and to provide money to the military to• . 141
clear the pipeline route and provide security for the pipeline. Plaintiffs
contend that Unocal knew or should have known that the military regime of
Burma had a history of abusing human rights in violation of customary
international law. 14 2 The Ninth Circuit's decision on defendant's motion to
dismiss will determine whether private multinational corporations may be
held liable under the ATS for human rights abuses committed by the
government that is "hosting" them.
Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, the Ninth Circuit has
139. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 2002 WL 31063976, (9th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2001), vacated 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
140. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
141. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
142. See id. (where plaintiffs claimed that the military was using "violence and intimidation to
relocate whole villages, enslave farmers living in the area of the proposed pipeline, and steal
farmers' property for the benefit of the pipeline[;]" plaintiffs also alleged that women and girls in
the region were the target of rape and other sexual abuse by military officials, when left behind
after male family members had been taken away to perform forced labor and when military
officials were guarding the women during periods of forced labor).
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discretion to consider whether forced labor and the other abuses that
plaintiffs allege Unocal committed in complicity with the Burmese
government creates a cause of action under the ATS. The Ninth Circuit
may review whether those alleged violations are sufficiently "specific,
universal, and obligatory" to rise to the level of customary international
law. If the plaintiffs prevail, it will signal that federal courts are still willing
to hear human rights violation suits against multinational corporations that
do business or invest in other countries. Conversely, if the plaintiffs lose,
corporations may be encouraged by the reduced risk of ATS liability to
invest in countries whose controlling regimes have a penchant for
committing human rights offenses.
One could argue that International human rights and worldwide
accountability, as safeguarded in FiMrtiga and Kadic have become
secondary to United States foreign policy objectives, including enhancing
the profitability of U.S. corporations operating overseas. The United States
has attempted to reaffirm its "superpower" status in the world by reverting
to a traditional paradigm of exclusive sovereignty marked by isolationism
and unilateral action. Regrettably, this "paradigm shift" has thrown human
rights jurisprudence, at least as administered in United States federal courts,
in reverse.
In 1789, accountability for transgressions committed in the
international arena underpinned political thought and behavior. The same
should be true today. In fact, increased globalization, made possible by
advances in technology and the improved economic connectivity between
nations, has only intensified the need for expanded international norms
which can be enforced anywhere in the world, including courts of the
United States. Unfortunately, however, the events of September 11, 2001,
have caused the United States government to view global mobility as a
threat to the security of the nation. As a result, the federal courts may no
longer be as receptive to human rights cases as they once were. Like the
other two branches of government, the judiciary is on a "war footing,"
which means, for the foreseeable future, that courts may well be inclined to
sacrifice individual rights under the guise of defending the security interests
of the United States.
